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INTRODUCTION1
In 2014, price shocks sent waves of financial distress throughout the
oil and gas industry, as the price of crude oil plummeted from a high of
$100.36/bbl in June to a low of $31.62/bbl by the beginning of February.2
This drop in prices hit many American producers especially hard because
a growing share of production in the United States has been sourced from
“unconventional” deposits with limited permeability, which involve
higher production costs relative to traditional sources of petroleum.3
Consequently, there is growing concern over bankruptcy in the industry,
with prices continuing to be suppressed over a year after their initial fall.4
1. This Article is based on a presentation by our firm at the 2014 Texas
Bench Bar Conference titled “Today’s Oil and Gas Market: Managing and
Mitigating Bankruptcy Risk.” David M. Bennett, Today’s Oil and Gas Market:
Managing and Mitigating Bankruptcy Risks (2014) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.tklaw.com/files/Publication/6bd977c5-ad04-4a0a-a4a3575e4dd4b242/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ab5898d2-0fca-455f-a285-5a
b58228cd3e/Today's%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Market%3B%20Managing%20a
nd%20Mitigating%20Bankruptcy%20Risks.pdf.
2. Crude Oil, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/crude-oil.aspx
(last visited Feb. 2, 2016).
3. Ed Crooks, US Shale Industry Braced for Bankruptcy, FIN. TIMES (Sept.
6, 2015, 1:37 PM), www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5974a3ce-52e0-11e5-b029b9d50a74fd14.html#axzz3wSuE689J; see also Jennifer Cruz, Peter W. Smith &
Sara Stanely, The Marcellus Shale Gas Boom in Pennsylvania: Employment and
Wage Trends (U.S. Bureau of Statistics Monthly Labor Report, Feb. 2014); U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-12-732, OIL AND GAS:
INFORMATION ON SHALE RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND
PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS (2012).
4. Crooks, supra note 3.
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The recent price shock illustrates just one of the many threats to parties
in an industry characterized by pervasive risk.5 From natural disasters to
human error, risk events may cause firms in the oil and gas industry to
incur debilitating costs that render them insolvent. As a result, the threat
of counterparty insolvency is always looming for parties to oil and gas
contracts.
Due to the omnipresent threat of counterparty insolvency, parties should
actively manage counterparty credit risk. Long-term credit risk management
in oil and gas contracts is challenging because production in some fields
lasts many decades and a contract counterparty may change completely or
suffer financial reverses. Accordingly, such long-term contracts should be
written with the view that one’s counterparty will evade its debts and will
be the subject of bankruptcy proceedings.
Although the institution of bankruptcy proceedings normally suggests
that many creditors will not be satisfied in full, there are a number of
strategies that a party to an oil and gas contract can employ to increase its
chances of satisfaction. These strategies should be considered before a
potential party enters into an agreement. That party may consider a range of
factors before determining whether to employ a particular strategy,
especially the type of contractual relationship under consideration.
This Article addresses five major contract relationships and furnishes
advice to protect clients or companies in the event of bankruptcy. These
relatively simple and inexpensive steps can save millions of dollars and
protect clients and companies from the draconian “strong arm” powers
given to a trustee or debtor-in-possession in bankruptcy.6
Part I of this Article discusses the treatment of claims in bankruptcy
proceedings generally as well as the significance of a creditor’s unsecured
claims in particular, providing background information for discussions of
the consequences of bankruptcy for specific contractual relationships.
Parts II through VI discuss the consequences of bankruptcy for parties to
sales contracts for oil and gas production, joint operating agreements, oil
and gas leases, purchase and sale agreements, and farmout agreements,
respectively, as well as furnish relevant, practical strategies. Part VII
discusses a final strategy that can be applied to various types of
relationships—“Bad Boy” guaranties. This Article concludes with a
summary of advice for protecting a party to oil and gas contracts from the
consequences of counterparty credit risk.

5. See generally ROBERTA BIGLIANI, REDUCING RISKS IN OIL AND GAS
OPERATIONS (2013), available at http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports
/minimizing-operational-risk-in-oil-gas-industry.pdf.
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2014).
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I. PRIORITY OF “CLAIMS” IN BANKRUPTCY
The practical advice presented in this Article are responses to the
treatment of “claims” in bankruptcy proceedings. Under the Bankruptcy
Code, a “claim” is essentially defined as a “right to payment” or a “right
to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise
to a right to payment.”7 A claim is treated differently depending on its
classification under the Bankruptcy Code, including whether it is, among
other things, secured or unsecured.8
The treatment of an unsecured claim in bankruptcy proceedings shows
the importance of obtaining adequate security from a potential bankruptcy
debtor. A claim is unsecured to the extent that the creditor has failed to
obtain a valid lien or security interest to secure the value of the debtor’s
obligation to the creditor.9 In most cases, such claims will be practically
worthless because there will be few assets of the debtor remaining after all
higher priority claims are satisfied.10
Claims are satisfied in accordance with a priority scheme provided by
the Bankruptcy Code as supplemented by relevant state law.11 The goal is
to be at the top of the food chain, which is basically delineated as follows:
1. Owners are at the top because an ownership interest passes
through bankruptcy.12 It is best to own mineral interests or real
property interests such as production payment, relinquished
interest, working interest, or farmout interest.
2. Covenants running with the land are next. If the obligations can
be characterized as covenant running with the land, the majority
view is the counterparty cannot the reject contract in bankruptcy.
3. Generally, secured creditors (lien creditors) are entitled to the
value of their collateral.
4. Administrative Claims (super-priority or general administrative)
(20 day claims) are fourth.
5. Unsecured Claims (priority or general unsecured) fall into the
fifth position.
6. Equity Interests (preferred or common) come last.

7. Id. § 101(5).
8. Id. § 507.
9. See id. § 506(a)(1).
10. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN A NUTSHELL 186
(8th ed. 2013).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 507.
12. See id. § 507.
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As this list makes clear, a secured creditor is in a more advantageous
position than an unsecured creditor and, thus, is more likely to have its
claims satisfied. Consequently, one way to manage counterparty credit
risk is by securing the obligations of potential debtors on the front end.
However, the mechanics of and issues surrounding securing a claim varies
depending on the type of contractual relationship under consideration.
II. SALES CONTRACTS FOR OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION
One type of contractual relationship that may be threatened by
bankruptcy proceedings is a sales contract for oil and gas production.
When oil and gas production is sold on credit without a security agreement
to secure the purchase price, the seller will bear significant risk of
nonpayment if the purchaser declares bankruptcy, as the seller will have a
mere unsecured claim.13 As a result, it is important for the seller to obtain
an attached and perfected security interest—or some other right—in
collateral to guarantee payment by purchasers. This observation is
important for both producers selling to first purchasers and first purchasers
selling to downstream purchasers.
In practice, oil and gas production is frequently bought and sold by
various parties before it reaches the end consumer. After producers extract
the oil or gas, first purchasers typically buy the oil or gas at the wellhead
from local tanks located on the leased premises, or at nearby market
centers. First purchasers often—particularly in the case of oil—transport
the products for temporary storage before reselling to downstream
purchasers, such as refiners or commodities traders. Consequently, each
party involved in the various transactions is paid on a different timeline,
resulting in open balances between parties at different points of the
process.
The timeline for payment under oil and gas sales contracts depends on
the nature of the interests involved. Producers are customarily paid by first
purchasers on either the 20th day or 25th day of each month for oil or gas
produced in the previous calendar month. Thus, producers have essentially
extended credit for 50 to 56 days of production.14 First purchasers are then
paid by downstream purchasers pursuant to the terms of their respective
agreements. The multiple parties involved with the production and
shipment of oil or gas results in competing interests.
Due to competing interests, sellers and lenders should timely perfect
security interests or liens in the oil and gas sold to outrank other creditors
13. See id. § 506(a)(1).
14. For example, SemCrude filed bankruptcy on the 20th day of the month to
maximize its cash, which resulted in maximum losses to its sellers.
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who may have interests in the same collateral. Although some of these
interests are brought about by specific clauses in the contract, others may
arise by operation of law.
Following bankruptcies of Basin, Inc., Brio Petroleum, Inc., Compton
Petroleum Corp., and Gratex Corp. in 1982, several states enacted
statutory producers’ liens.15 Texas,16 Oklahoma,17 New Mexico,18
Kansas,19 and North Dakota20 have enacted statutes that grant royalty
owners, producers, and other oil and gas interest owners a statutory
security lien to secure payment of the purchase price for that production.21
Importantly, certain states allow these security interests to be treated as
purchase money security interests (“PMSI”).22 A PMSI is a security
interest or claim on property that enables a lender or provider of goods on
credit who provides financing for the acquisition of goods or equipment to
obtain priority ranking ahead of other secured creditors.23 Because the
producer is the one actually furnishing the goods—in this case the oil or
gas—it is logical that a producer have a PMSI-like lien in such goods and
the proceeds of their sale. Before a party may take advantage of the super
priority of such producers’ liens, however, those liens must be made
effective against third parties.
Some states provide for producers’ liens that are not automatically
perfected and involve certain temporal limitations. For example, to perfect
and maintain the New Mexico producers’ lien, the interest owners must
file a Notice of Lien (similar to notices that are needed to perfect statutory
15. See generally Terry I. Cross, Oil and Gas Product Liens—Statutory
Security Interests for Producers and Royalty Owners Under the Statutes of
Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q.
REP. 418 (1996).
16. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.343 (West 2011).
17. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 549.1, 549.3 (West 2011).
18. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-9-1, 48-9-3 (West 2003).
19. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-339a (West 2008). Interest owners in Kansas
are required to file an “affidavit of production” in the register of deeds of the
county where the oil and gas is produced to perfect the security interest. Id. § 849-339a(b). Like Texas, the security interest in and lien on produced oil and gas is
treated as a PMSI for purposes of determining priority relative to other Article 9
security interests. Id. § 84-9-339a(h).
20. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 35-37-02 (West 2008).
21. Mississippi grants a lien to royalty owners to secure the payment of the
royalty proceeds. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 53-3-41 (West 2014). Unlike the other
liens, however, a producer who is not also a royalty owner would not be protected.
Id.
22. See supra notes 16, 19.
23. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103 (West 2011).
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mechanics liens) “after fifteen days and within forty-five days after
payment is due by terms of agreement.”24 The lien terminates if the notice
is not timely filed, and if timely filed, the lien expires one year after the
date of the filing of the notice unless an action to enforce the lien is
begun.25 North Dakota’s Oil and Gas Owner’s Lien Act26 is similar to New
Mexico’s. North Dakota’s Oil and Gas Owner’s Lien Act grants interest
owners a continuing security interest in and lien on unpaid oil or gas until
the purchase price has been paid to the interest owner.27 To perfect the
security interest on oil and gas, producers are required to file a UCC-1A
in North Dakota’s central indexing system, record the lien in the real estate
records in the county in which the well is located, and provide other
interest owners with a copy of the notice of the lien by registered mail.28
The security interest must be perfected within 90 days from the date of
production; otherwise the security interest will not have priority over other
security interests in the same oil or gas.29
Other states provide for producers’ liens that are “automatically”
perfected.30 For example, under the Texas producers’ lien statute, a
security interest “is perfected automatically without the filing of a
financing statement.”31 Specifically, the statute provides that “[i]f the
interest of the secured party is evidenced by a deed, mineral deed,
reservation in either, oil or gas lease, assignment, or any other such record
recorded in the real property records of a county clerk, that record is
effective as a filed financing statement.”32
Even in states that allow automatic perfection, producers may receive
better treatment if they also file a UCC-1. For example, while the Texas
producers’ lien is automatically perfected under the Texas statute,33 the
bankruptcy court for the District of Delaware held that a producers’ lien
was subordinate to a contractual secured lender’s lien because the Texas
producer had not filed a UCC-1 in the state of incorporation of the
purchaser of the production before the contractual secured lender’s lien.34
24. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-9-5 (West 2003).
25. Id.
26. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-37-01 to 06 (West 2008 & Supp. 2015).
27. Id. § 35-37-02.
28. Id. § 35-37-04.
29. Id.
30. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.343 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 52, § 549.1 (West 2011).
31. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.343(b).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Samson Res. Co. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re SemCrude, L.P.), 407 B.R.
140, 158 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).
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The lower priority resulted in the loss of approximately $57 million to the
Texas owner’s interest in the oil and gas proceeds.35 Thus, to ensure the
best priority for the Texas producers’ lien, producers who are selling on
credit should file a UCC-1 in the state of incorporation of the first
purchaser of the production rather than rely solely on automatic
perfection.36 A recent check of UCC records shows this advice is not being
followed. But the lessons learned from bankruptcies of large purchasers
such as Enron and Semcrude show that it needs to be done regardless of
the size or reputation of the purchaser of production. A protective UCC
preserving possibly millions of dollars in liens can be filed at a relatively
nominal cost.37
Assuming that the security interest is timely perfected, then the security
interest and lien takes priority over the rights of persons whose rights or
claims arise afterwards, but may not take priority over the security interest
and liens previously created and perfected.38
The Oklahoma legislature amended the producers’ lien statute in an
attempt to ensure both automatic perfection and first priority to producer
lienholders following the Semcrude decision.39 The Oklahoma statute
purports to grant producers an automatically perfected lien that has first
priority over other competing Article 9 security interests even if the
competing interests are first-in-time.40 The sole exception to this grant of

35. Id.; Victor Chiu & Penelope Christophorou, Presentation, Joint Meeting of
the UCC Committee and the Commercial Finance Committee (Aug. 1, 2009),
available at https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL710000pub/materi
als/2009/annual/semgroup-bankruptcy.pdf.
36. Note that filing a protective UCC might not guarantee the producer is
senior to a lender. Because the producers’ lien was a non-standard UCC provision
and no UCC-1 was filed, the court did not need to address the issue of priority
based on date of filing, which might give the bank another argument if it filed
first. If a producer does not file a UCC, however, the secured lender will win. As
of January 2016, the producers are still appealing their treatment to the Second
Circuit. As long as there is any question, the better practice is to file a protective
UCC.
37. For example, in Delaware, Capitol Services charges $125 to file a UCC1, plus cost of any paralegal time, and a state charge of $2 per page in excess of
four pages. If the same purchaser is in multiple states with statutory liens, it can
file one UCC for multiple states.
38. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 35-37-01 (West 2008).
39. See Sahar Jooshani, There’s a New Act in Town: How the Oklahoma Oil
and Gas Owners’ Lien Act of 2010 Strengthens the Position of Oklahoma Interest
Owners, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 133, 142 (2012). The Texas legislature did not address
the Sumcrude problem.
40. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 549.7 (West 2011).
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priority is a permitted lien.41 A “permitted lien” under the Oklahoma
statute is a “validly perfected and enforceable lien created by statute or by
rule or regulation of a governmental agency for storage or transportation
charges . . . owed by a first purchaser in relation to oil or gas originally
purchased under an agreement to sell.”42 Thus, a permitted lien is a narrow
exception to the otherwise broad superior priority granted in favor of first
sellers of production by the Oklahoma producers’ lien statute. Although
the Oklahoma legislature purportedly addressed the Semcrude problem,
until courts decide the legislative fix worked, the better practice is to file
a protective UCC-1.
In summary, perfecting producers’ liens should be on a marketing
checklist because when in bankruptcy, the failure to properly perfect
producers’ liens in accordance with the specific jurisdiction’s statute poses
a risk of significant loss to producers as a result of lower priority.43 A
producer’s inability to recover amounts owed because of lower priority
and the ensuring lower recovery as an unsecured creditor is a real threat to
an otherwise sound contractual relationship is one of many risks that
unprepared parties face as a result of a bankruptcy proceeding.
III. JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENTS
A second type of contractual relationship that may be threatened by
bankruptcy proceedings is a joint operating agreement (“JOA”). A JOA is
an “agreement between or among interested parties for the operation of a
tract or leasehold for oil, gas and other minerals,” by which “[t]he parties to
the agreement share in the expenses of the operations and in the proceeds of
development.”44 It is important to note that “the agreement normally is not
intended to affect the ownership of the minerals or the rights to produce,”
and, thus, the JOA does not create a separate entity distinct from the working
interest owners who are parties to the agreement.45 Consequently, working
interest owners must include provisions in the JOA that allocate drilling and
production risks among themselves. This allocation of risks may be
disturbed if one of the working interest owners is the subject of bankruptcy
proceedings. Accordingly, as this Part will show, a party to a JOA should
41. Id.
42. Id. § 549.2(11)(b).
43. For the importance of checklists in every business endeavor, this Author
recommends the very interesting, best-selling book, ATUL GAWANDE, THE
CHECKLIST MANIFESTO (2011).
44. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL
AND GAS LAW, § 8-J (LexisNexis 2014).
45. Id.
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protect against working interest owner credit risk by obtaining and
perfecting a security interest or a party to the JOA may also have protection
through setoff and recoupment.
A. Mitigating Credit Risk by Obtaining and Perfecting a Security Interest
or Lien
One way to mitigate working interest owner credit risk under a JOA
is by obtaining and perfecting a lien or security interest in oil and gas
leases, personal property, or fixtures, as are specifically set forth in the
Model Form Operating Agreement. Without a perfected lien or security
interest, a party to the JOA will have a mere unsecured claim for another
working interest owner’s share of production and drilling costs under the
agreement.46 Thus, to protect itself to the greatest extent possible, a party
to the JOA should make sure its interest is both adequately perfected and
of maximum value.
1. Avoiding Common Pitfalls When Perfecting a Security Interest or
Lien
The importance of an adequately perfected security interest or lien for
securing a counterparty’s obligations under a JOA should not be
underestimated. Remember that no matter how stellar the counterparty is
today, documents should be drafted and security interests perfected under
the assumption that the interest will either be assigned to a persistent debt
evader or the counterparty’s new management will worsen. Bankruptcy
most often is a response to severe financial distress and usually is a last
resort because of the high cost and risk to the enterprise.47 Due to the
limited resources available to repay creditors, pre-bankruptcy general
unsecured claims and open-account debts often are paid either pennies on
the dollar or not at all. Given this present-tense risk of non-payment or
non-performance by the counterparty, the risk that the counterparty will
become bankrupt should be considered from the beginning of the
contractual relationship. Obtaining a lien or security interest to secure a
claim under a contract is a first line of defense. The steps required to
46. 11 U.S.C. §507(3) (2014).
47. In fact, bankruptcy comes with high costs of administration and the need
for transparency in business practices and structure. And there is no guarantee that
a company that goes into bankruptcy will come out on the other side. See
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A
Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 636 (2008) (approximately 30%
to 50% of Chapter 11 cases filed confirm plans).
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perfect the liens and security interests available to secure different oil and
gas contracts, however, will vary with the nature of the contract, and a
party must seek to avoid common pitfalls to ensure its security interest or
lien is effective against third persons and trustees in bankruptcy.
a. Failure to Perfect a Security Interest or Lien
A common pitfall associated with obtaining a security interest or lien is
failing to perfect that interest before the institution of bankruptcy proceedings.
A lien or security interest only provides protection in bankruptcy if it is timely
and properly perfected.48 Although—in the absence of bankruptcy—
properly attached security interests and lien rights are enforceable by the
creditor or the lienholder against the debtor,49 once bankruptcy is filed, in
most cases, an unperfected lien or security interest is of little or no value.
Unperfected liens and security interests are of little or no value
because a debtor in bankruptcy has sweeping “strong arm” powers that
permit the trustee to avoid unperfected liens or security interests.50 Once
an unperfected lien or security interest is avoided, the creditor will be left
as a general unsecured creditor down the bankruptcy payment waterfall
with a reduced recovery, if any.51 This result cannot be cured after the
institution of bankruptcy proceedings. Upon the filing of a bankruptcy
case, the automatic stay prevents a holder of an unperfected lien or security
interest from perfecting such interest.52 Thus, after the petition date, the
holder of an unperfected contractual lien or security interest holder in most
cases will have little recourse other than its rights as an unsecured creditor.
b. Perfecting a Security Interest or Lien Against the Wrong
Counterparty
Another all-too-common mistake, particularly with oil and gas assets
for which record title may be a complex issue, is to obtain and perfect a
lien or a security interest against the wrong entity. Corporate formalities
48. 11 U.S.C. § 544.
49. First Cmty. Bank v. E.M. Williams & Sons, Inc. (In re E.M. Williams &
Sons, Inc.), No. 08-3055-KRH, 2009 WL 2211727, at *2 n.6 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
July 17, 2009); In re Kwan Hun Baek, 240 B.R. 633, 635 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
50. See, e.g., Knostman v. W. Loop Sav. Ass’n (In re Newman), 993 F.2d 90
(5th Cir. 1993).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 507.
52. Id. § 362(a)(4) (staying any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien). But
it should be noted that holders of inchoate mechanics liens that incept before
bankruptcy may file an affidavit or other such filing to perfect such interest.
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are recognized in bankruptcy, which typically means that each affiliated
debtor will file its own bankruptcy case with each debtor being treated as
separate for purposes of, among other things, distributions to creditors.53
While affiliated debtors may frequently be jointly administered in
bankruptcy, substantive consolidation—treating separate debtors as a
single distributive pool—is the exception rather than the rule.54 In the
absence of substantive consolidation of all the debtors, an undertaking that
was originally given by an entity that did not actually hold an interest in
the property will typically mean that the purported lien or security interest
is treated as a nullity and that the holder of the security agreement is a
general unsecured creditor in the bankruptcy case. Thus, it is crucial for
the counterparty seeking to establish secured status in a bankruptcy case
to ensure that the lien or security interest is obtained from, and perfected
against, the record owner of the property.
A financing statement that fails to sufficiently provide the debtor’s
name could be “seriously misleading,” and therefore not effective to
perfect a security interest. For example, in In re Tyringham Holdings, Inc.
v. Suna Brothers, Inc., a relatively minor error voided the security
interest.55 Suna filed a UCC-1 financing statement to perfect its security
interest in consigned goods under Article 9.56 The debtor’s name, as
contained in Virginia’s records, was “Tyringham Holdings, Inc.,” but
Suna’s financing statement listed the debtor’s name only as “Tyringham
Holdings.”57 The bankruptcy court held that the financing statement was
seriously misleading because the search logic used by the state of
incorporation considered “Inc.” a significant and necessary word.58 Therefore,
it is imperative to name the proper entity when perfecting a security interest
or lien against a counterparty.
c. Failure to Perfect a Security Interest or Lien as Soon as Possible
A final common pitfall associated with obtaining security interests or
liens concerns the timing of the perfection of that interest. In practice, to
be of value in bankruptcy, the lien or security interest should be perfected
contemporaneously with the attachment of the lien or security interest for
53. In re Fernandes, 346 B.R. 521, 522 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006).
54. Clyde Bergemann, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (In re Babcock &
Wilcox Co.), 250 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Las Torres Dev., L.L.C.,
413 B.R. 687, 693 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
55. Tyringham Holdings, Inc. v. Suna Bros., Inc. (In re Tyringham Holdings,
Inc.), 354 B.R. 363, 365 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 366.
58. Id. at 368.
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two reasons. First, perfection of the lien or security interest after the fact
will result in a preference or avoidance risk to the counterparty if the
debtor files bankruptcy within 90 days of perfection.59 Second, the lien or
security interest only has value to the extent that the value of the
underlying property exceeds the amount of any prior liens against the same
property.60 Because the priority of a lien or security interest often is based
upon first to file, value that otherwise could be captured in a bankruptcy
case often is lost by a delay in perfection and resultant loss of priority to
intervening liens.61
In an age of highly-leveraged companies and mezzanine lending, it is
important to consider the impact of modern financing practices on the
value of contractual liens for junior secured creditors. If, for example, the
lien of the secured financier is recorded in advance of the recordation of a
JOA, which has an imbedded reciprocal lien among the parties to the JOA
upon the filing of a bankruptcy case, the lien in favor of the secured
financier may consume all the available value and leave the counterparty
to the JOA with a wholly unsecured claim. This reality of modern finance
highlights the need to record and perfect a lien or security interest as soon
as possible to ensure the highest priority possible upon the filing of a
bankruptcy case.
In short, to maximize value to a secured creditor once bankruptcy is
filed, a lien or security interest should be perfected against the correct
counterparty contemporaneously with the attachment of the security
interest or lien. But the manner of attachment and perfection will vary with
the type of lien and applicable state law.
2. Perfecting Oil and Gas Liens
JOAs give rise to credit risk for all of the working interest owners that
are parties to the agreements, both operators and non-operators. For
instance, operators frequently make advances on behalf of non-operators for
both capital expenditures and lease operating expenses. Upon the
bankruptcy of the non-operator, claims for both capital expenditure amounts
and for unpaid lease operating expenses will be prepetition claims against
59. Bergner v. Bank One, Milwaukee N.A. (In re P.A. Bergner & Co.
Holding Co.), 187 B.R. 964, 983 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1995).
60. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); Fin.
Sec. Assurance Inc. v. T-H New Orleans L.P. (In re T-H New Orleans L.P.), 116
F.3d 790, 800 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding junior lienholders only have a secured
claim if value of collateral exceeds senior liens).
61. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.322(a)(1) (West 2011); U.C.C. § 9322 (2010).
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the non-operator. Operators, on the other hand, typically market
hydrocarbons on behalf of non-operators before paying the non-operators.
As a result, the non-operators often take the credit risk of the operator. In
that circumstance, the bankruptcy of the operator will result in the nonoperators being left with claims for hydrocarbons that have been produced
and sold prior to the bankruptcy case.
To reduce this risk, the terms of JOAs often include reciprocal
contractual liens to secure the performance of a counterparty. For example,
Section VII.B of the A.A.P.L. Form 610-1989 Model Form Operating
Agreement, which is one of the most commonly used forms of operating
agreements, includes a reciprocal contractual lien and security interest in
both current and future acquired real property located within the “Contract
Area,” and a security interest in the currently-owned and after-acquired
personal property and fixtures related to the real property.
The manner of perfecting the lien and security interest in a JOA will
vary with applicable state law. To ensure the enforceability and priority of
such liens and security interests in the underlying oil and gas interests, the
parties must perfect these interests by executing, acknowledging, and
recording a memorandum of the operating agreement in the appropriate
land records of the county or counties where the lands are located.62 If a
Contract Area under an operating agreement is located in two or more
counties, parties should record the memorandum in all applicable counties.

62. See, e.g., Amarex, Inc. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 772 P.2d 905, 906
(Okla. 1987) (“The operator’s lien created by the A.A.P.L. Form 610–1977 Model
Form Operating Agreement is a contractual lien. In order to perfect such a
contractual lien against a working interest owner’s real property rights, an
operator must file an operating agreement in the land records of the county or
counties where the lands are located. Such an instrument must be executed,
attested and acknowledged in accordance with the statutory formalities found in
Title 16 of the Oklahoma Statutes.”); Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1982) (reference to an operating agreement in the
chain of title placed competing interests on notice of the operating agreement);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:217 (Supp. 2015) (“In lieu of filing an [operating]
agreement as provided in R.S. 31:216, the parties thereto may file a declaration
signed by them, or signed by any person designated in the agreement as the
general operator or agent of the parties, describing the lands affected by the
mineral rights that are the subject of the agreement, stating in general terms the
nature or import of the agreement, and stating where the agreement may be found.
The recording officer of the parish in which the declaration is filed may copy into
his records only the declaration, without the exhibit attached thereto. The
declaration when so filed shall serve as full and complete notice of the agreement
to the same extent as if the original agreement had been filed and recorded.”).
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To perfect in personality, parties must file a UCC-1 with the Secretary of State
of the operating agreement counterparty’s state of incorporation.63
In some states such as North Dakota, the working interest owners rely
upon the forced pooling order to allocate expenses and risk penalties and often
do not enter into an operating agreement. If the working interest owners do
enter into an operating agreement, the agreement merely supplements the
forced pooling order. Any liens granted in forced pooling orders need to be
perfected in accordance with state law. For example, in addition to any
contractual lien, Oklahoma grants operators of pooled units a statutory lien on
participating interests in the unit to secure the costs of operation.64 These liens
may be perfected by filing a land-record filing that shows the unit approval
and the participation of particular leases or interests.65
B. Mitigating Risk Through Setoff and Recoupment
Another way to mitigate working interest owner credit risk under a JOA
is through setoff and recoupment. In many cases, counterparties to oil and gas
agreements will have reciprocal payables and receivables owed and owing to
each other. For example, a producer that has entered into a gathering
agreement—in which hydrocarbons produced at the well head are physically
sold to the gatherer—may simultaneously have both an obligation to pay for
ongoing gathering services (an account payable) and a right to be paid for
hydrocarbons that are being continuously purchased by the gatherer (an
account receivable). This scenario may create a right of setoff in the context
of bankruptcy proceedings.66
A right of setoff is analogous to a security interest67 and arises where
counterparties have reciprocal debts and obligations.68 In some circumstances,
63. Arrow Oil & Gas, Inc. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re SemCrude, L.P.), 407
B.R. 112, 136 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).
64. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.8 (2011) (voluntary pooled unit
liens); Id. § 87.1(e) (2011 & Supp. 2015) (forced pooled unit liens).
65. See TCINA, Inc. v. NOCO Inv. Co., 95 P.3d 193, 195 (Okla. Civ. App.
2004) (interpreting operator’s liens that arise under Oklahoma Statutes title 52,
section 287.8); see also GasRock Capital, L.L.C. v. EnDevCo Eureka, L.L.C., 313
P.3d 1028, 1034–35 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013) (holding that an operator’s lien
subject to Oklahoma Statutes title 52, section 287.8 was perfected by the landrecord filing of a notice of approval of the unit and that it was “inconsequential”
when drilling services were performed).
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (2014).
67. The right to offset is termed the right to “setoff” in the Bankruptcy Code.
See 11 U.S.C. § 553(a); In re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc., 391 F.3d 629, 636
(5th Cir. 2004).
68. See 11 U.S.C. § 553.
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accounts payable and accounts receivable may be set off against each other.69
In bankruptcy, parties can offset “mutual” debts—debts between the same
parties standing in the same capacity—that arose prior to the commencement
of the bankruptcy case.70 The Bankruptcy Code does not create this right of
setoff; it merely preserves setoff rights created under applicable nonbankruptcy law and then only to the extent that the conditions of section 553
have been satisfied.71
The threshold determination in every case involving section 553 is the
source of the alleged setoff right. Recognizing the right of setoff in bankruptcy
often allows the creditor holding the right to recover a greater percentage of
its claim than other creditors who have no setoff entitlement.72 The automatic
stay, however, prevents a contract counterparty from offsetting an account
payable against an account receivable without modification of the automatic
stay.73
A related contractual risk-mitigation principle is recoupment. Setoff
applies to mutual debts between the same parties standing in the same capacity
but does not require that the debts arise out of the same agreement.
Recoupment, on the other hand, is the netting of obligations within or among
the same agreement.74 Thus, recoupment is more narrowly applied.75 But
69. See id.
70. See id. § 553(a); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A, 814 F.2d
1030, 1036 (5th Cir. 1987) (mutuality requirement for setoff was met because the
debt was incurred prepetition); Sherman v. First City Bank of Dall. (In re United
Sciences of Am., Inc.), 893 F.2d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 1990) (bank’s setoff was not
in violation of the Bankruptcy Code since the bank’s agreement created the
mutuality of the debts between the parties); Cohen v. Sav. Building & Loan Co.
(In re Bevill, Breler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp.), 896 F.2d 54, 59 (3d Cir.
1990) (bank’s possession of interest payments does not constitute a mutual debt
for purposes of setoff because bank was merely a trustee); Davidovich v. Welton
(In re Davidovich), 901 F.2d 1533, 1538 (10th Cir. 1990) (former partner was not
entitled to offset for amount allegedly owed to him pursuant to debtor’s postpetition default because he did not meet the “mutuality” requirement).
71. Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1995); N.Y. State
Elec. & Gas Co. v. McMahon (In re McMahon), 129 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1997);
Stephenson v. Salisbury (In re Coreland Corp.), 967 F.2d 1069, 1076 (5th Cir.
1992).
72. See Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 237 U.S. 447, 455 (1915).
73. Szymanski v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. (In re Szymanski), 413 B.R. 232,
240 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009).
74. Holford v. Powers (In re Holford), 896 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1990); In
re Brown, 325 B.R. 169, 175–76 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2005).
75. Recently, some courts have applied recoupment even more narrowly. See,
e.g., Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Mirant Ams. Energy Mktg., LP (In re Mirant
Corp.), 318 B.R. 377, 381 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that recoupment
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recoupment is not subject to the automatic stay.76 Several courts have applied
the doctrine of recoupment and lifted the automatic stay, to the extent
necessary, to allow an operator to exercise its rights against a non-operator
pursuant to a JOA.77 Therefore, a contract counterparty should consider
whether the netting of amounts owed to and owed by a debtor are so closely
tied together contractually that recoupment, not setoff, may be applicable.
IV. TREATMENT OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS AND OIL AND GAS LEASES
A third type of contractual relationship that could be threatened by
bankruptcy proceedings is a mineral lease. Because a mineral lease involves
ongoing rights and obligations, there may be a concern that the lease might be
held to be an “executory contract” or “unexpired lease” under the Bankruptcy
Code. Counterparty credit risk may be drastically different depending on
whether a contract qualifies as an “executory contract” or an “unexpired
lease” under the Bankruptcy Code. In particular, debtors may reject executory
contracts and unexpired “true” leases, in which case the other party may be
left with a mere unsecured claim for damages.78
A. Characterization of Oil and Gas Leases
The nature of the rights created or conveyed by an agreement is a
matter of non-bankruptcy law.79 Although the majority of oil and gas
contracts—for example, operating agreements, participation agreements,
area of mutual interest agreements, development agreements, take-or-pay
contracts, etc.—are executory contracts governed by section 365 of the

should be narrowly applied and that an “overpayment or something like it” such
as “harm to a creditor or benefit to a debtor in excess of that contemplated by the
Code” must be shown to justify recoupment).
76. In re Holford, 896 F.2d at 179; In re McWilliams, 384 B.R. 728, 729
(Bankr. D.N.J. 2008).
77. See, e.g., Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank v. Enstar Petroleum Co. (In re Buttes Res.
Co.), 89 B.R. 613, 617 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988) (holding that an operator could
recoup production costs advanced before the petition from pre- and post-petition
proceeds payments owed to the non-operator debtor); Garmers Union Cent. Exch.,
Inc. v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank (In re Buttes Gas & Oil), 72 B.R. 236 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1987) (holding that the doctrine of recoupment applied where the operator’s
right to reimbursement for costs and the non-operator’s right to proceeds arose
from a JOA).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2014).
79. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (the Bankruptcy Code does
not create or define property interests but leaves that for state law or for applicable
non-bankruptcy law).
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Bankruptcy Code,80 the nature of a mineral lease varies among different
jurisdictions.
In almost all hydrocarbon producing states, an oil, gas, or mineral
lease conveys a real property interest to the lessee.81 Thus, for the most
part, an oil and gas lease creates a presently vested interest in real property
that is not subject to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.82 Even if a
debtor–lessor were able to reject an oil and gas lease in bankruptcy, section
365 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the lessee to retain its rights under the
lease for the term of the lease and any extensions.83
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) and the Bureau
of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”) of the Department of
Interior (“DOI”), however, have stated that the apparent position of the
United States government is that a federal lease is subject to rejection
under section 365.84 The DOI reasons that federal leases are governed by
federal, rather than state, law and are subject to disposition under sections
365 and 541 of the Bankruptcy Code based on the plain language of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), which includes the
statement that OCS leases are “rental agreements to use real property.”85

80. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 69 B.R. 960, 963 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
81. See, e.g., Foothills Tex., Inc., v. MTGLQ Investors, L.P. (In re: Foothills
Tex., Inc.), 476 B.R. 143 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012); In re WRT Energy Corp., 202
B.R. 579 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1996); In re Frederick Petroleum Corp., 98 B.R. 762
(S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Hanson Oil Co., 97 B.R. 468 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989).
82. Terry Oilfield Supply Co. v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 195 B.R. 66, 70–73
(S.D. Tex. 1966); In re WRT Energy Corp., 202 B.R. at 583; In re Frederick
Petroleum, 98 B.R. at 767; In re Clark Res., 68 B.R. 358, 360 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1986).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii).
84. See, e.g., United States’ Motion to Intervene, NGP Capital Res. Co. v.
ATP Oil & Gas Corp., No. 12-36187, Adv. No. 12-03443 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012)
[Dkt No. 13] (“[A] Federal Lease is, pursuant to its enabling statutes, a ‘rental
agreement to use real property’ subject to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
“On October 1, 2011, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement (BOEMRE), formerly the Minerals Management Service (MMS),
was replaced by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) as part of a major
reorganization.” Reorganization of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulation and Enforcement, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REG. &
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.boemre.gov/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
85. See Frontier Energy, LLC v. Aurora Energy, Ltd. (In re Aurora Oil & Gas
Corp.), 439 B.R. 674, 680 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting 11 U.S.C. §
365(m)).
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Although many cases have addressed the issue of whether a mineral
lease is a true lease or an executory contract under section 365,86 none have
considered this issue with respect to a federal OCS lease. Nonetheless, it is
typical for the OCS and other governmental agencies to take the position
that government oil and gas leases are not conveyances of an interest in real
property and are, in fact, subject to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.87
B. Assumption and Assignment of Oil and Gas Leases
A debtor may, subject to court approval, assume and assign executor
contracts and unexpired leases. Anti-alienation provisions that limit or
prohibit the assignment of a contract or lease, however, are unenforceable
in bankruptcy.88 Therefore, a debtor for the most part has the power to
assign a contract or lease without the consent of contract counterparties,
which would be required in the absence of bankruptcy. For example, a
debtor could assume and assign an operating agreement over the objection
of the non-operating joint interest owners, even if, in the absence of
bankruptcy, consent of the non-operator would have been a necessary
condition to such assignment.89
While a debtor decides whether to assume or reject an executory
contract or unexpired lease, the non-debtor party must continue to perform
under the contract.90 During this “gap period,” the non-debtor party will
bear the risk and uncertainty that results from not knowing whether the
contract will be rejected, assumed, or assumed and assigned.91 Particularly
with “core contracts” that are central to a producer’s business, the
uncertainty surrounding whether such an agreement will be assumed or
rejected and whether the counterparty will have sufficient capital to meet
its ongoing obligations thereunder can layer on enormous additional risks
for capital-intensive projects. In certain circumstances, a creditor may seek

86. See, e.g., Terry Oilfield Supply Co. v. Am. Sec. Bank, N.A., 195 B.R. 66,
70 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996) (showing that Texas has determined that mineral lease
is not an executor contract under section 365).
87. United States’ Motion to Intervene, supra note 84; Response of the
United States to Trustee’s Motion for Determination, Sonoma Energy Corp., No.
08-34430-H4-7 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.) [Dkt. No. 116].
88. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f).
89. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 69 B.R. 960, 963 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
90. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 532 (1984).
91. See Mitchell E. Ayer, Common Issues in Oil and Gas Bankruptcy, 34
ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 239, 243–46 (2013).
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to reduce this uncertainty by seeking to shorten the time period for a debtor
to assume or reject an agreement.92
In addition, as more Chapter 11 cases culminate in sales of the debtors’
assets, debtors—often at the behest of prospective buyers—often link the
sale of assets pursuant to section 363 (through a plan of reorganization or
otherwise) to assumption and assignment of contracts pursuant to section
365.93 Assumption and assignment of an executory contract or unexpired
lease requires notice to the non-debtor party and a showing, among other
things that: (1) any defaults pursuant to the contract sought to be assigned
have or will be cured as a condition to such assignment, and (2) there is
“adequate assurance of future performance” under the terms of the
contract on the part of prospective assignee.94 As sales of all or a portion
of the debtors’ assets continue to be a preferred exit strategy for Chapter
11 debtors, contract counterparties must take care to track bankruptcy
cases for developments that could impact their rights.95
V. PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENTS
Another type of contractual relationship that may be threatened by
bankruptcy proceedings is a purchase and sale agreement (“PSA”). A PSA
typically does not immediately transfer ownership. There is usually a
period of time to conduct due diligence between the signing of the PSA
and the closing.96 Prior to consummation, a PSA is almost certainly an
executory contract subject to rejection by the bankrupt debtor.97 But even
after a transaction has been consummated, there may be claims—such as

92. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2); Tex. Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de P.R., 360
F.2d 582, 583 (5th Cir. 1966). In a Chapter 11 case, a debtor has until confirmation
of a plan—which, in some cases, may take a year or longer—to assume or reject
an executory contract in the absence of a court order shortening that time period.
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2).
93. See, e.g., In re Cano Petroleum, Inc., No. 12-31549, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS
3281 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 18, 2012).
94. River Prod. Co. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 730 (5th Cir.
1990).
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(B), (C).
96. If the diligence is done in advance, the parties may have a transaction
“sign and close” on the same day.
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 365; Butler v. Resident Care Innovation Corp., 241 B.R.
37, 45–46 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1999) (finding the agreements at issue to be executory
because the agreements remained substantially unperformed by both parties).
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claims for indemnity—that arise under the agreement that need to be taken
into account once the debtor enters bankruptcy.
Creditors arguably must file such contingent claims, which arise under
fully consummated agreements, or risk losing them.98 When a party to a
PSA has been given notice of the bankruptcy of a counterparty,
consideration should be given to what, if any, ongoing claims may exist
against the debtor. For example, there may be outstanding indemnity
obligations on the part of the buyer—such as for plug and abandonment or
other remediation liability—that continue long after consummation of the
transaction. Even if these contingent claims have not been liquidated, the
Bankruptcy Code in some circumstances permits estimation of these
contingent claims in a manner that will permit such claimants to participate
in distributions in a bankruptcy case.99 Accordingly, a proof of claim
should be filed under these circumstances or the creditor will risk the loss
of the claim (contingent or not) forever.
VI. MITIGATING RISKS RELATED TO FARMOUTS
AND PRODUCTION PAYMENTS
A final type of contractual relationship that may be threatened by
bankruptcy proceedings is a farmout agreement. A farmout agreement is “a
contract to assign oil and gas lease rights in certain acreage upon completion
of drilling obligations and the performance of any other covenants and
conditions therein contained.”100 Because this arrangement usually arises
when a mineral lessee is unable to maintain its lease past the primary term
and the lease is nearing expiration, the lessee will “farm out” its lease in
exchange for an overriding royalty or carried interest.101 Although this
arrangement is technically an executory contract and would otherwise be
subject to avoidance,102 there are special rules regarding farmout agreements.
The Bankruptcy Code contains a special set of rules—or “safe harbor”
provisions—for both the farmee and the holder of a production payment
in circumstances spelled out by the Bankruptcy Code.103 If a farmout falls
within the bankruptcy safe harbor, then even a debtor’s rejection of the
farmout agreement as an executory contract will not impact the rights of
the farmee, at least with respect to any interest that had been earned as of
98. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(c).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 957 (2d Cir. 1993).
100. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, OIL AND GAS 774 (9th ed. 2011).
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4).

884

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

the petition date.104 Further, a production payment that meets the statutory
definition is subject to its own safe harbor and is a property right separate
and apart from the bankruptcy estate.105
The distinction between the holder of a separate property interest—
like a production payee or farmee—and a secured creditor is a crucial
distinction in bankruptcy. This is because a creditor’s separate property
interest, for the most part, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court and, therefore, is not subject to being stripped or
modified in bankruptcy.106 In contrast, if a counterparty is merely a secured
creditor, the counterparty’s property interest is subject to the increased risk
of impact, including a bankruptcy court: (1) permitting a debtor to use the
proceeds or revenues from the collateral over the objection of the secured
creditor pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 363(c)(2), or (2) forcing,
through a plan of reorganization pursuant to section 1129(b), a
modification of repayment terms on the contract counterparty—for
example, a “cramdown.”
Thus, if a counterparty is choosing, for example, between a conveyance
of a production payment or a claim that is secured by a claim on property of
the estate, in many cases, the former is preferable because the production
payment should “pass through” the bankruptcy case with a reduced risk of
impairment.
VII. INCLUDE BAD BOY GUARANTIES IN THE “CREDIT TOOLKIT”
WHEN CONDUCTING OIL AND GAS DEALS
Although some strategies are particular to the contractual relationship
under consideration, others may apply more widely. One such example is
the “Bad Boy” guaranty.
“Bad Boy” or “Springing Recourse” guaranties107 have changed the
face of real estate lending. In the 1980s, real estate developers would put
their single asset properties with non-recourse mortgages into bankruptcy
with the hope that keeping it in bankruptcy would allow them a chance to
have rents or prices increase. This tactic increased the cost of lenders to
foreclose. The mortgage lenders’ response was to have the mortgage
104. See In re Res. Tech. Corp., 254 B.R. 215, 222 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000).
The language of section 541(b)(4)(A) could also be read to insulate unearned
acreage as of the petition date; however, no court has directly addressed such
issue.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4)(B).
106. 11 U.S.C. § 541; but see 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (permitting bankruptcy trustee
to force a sale of a co-owner’s interest along with the debtor’s interest in property).
107. Such guaranties are sometimes referred to as “non-recourse carveouts.”
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documents provide that the borrower and one or more guarantors will
become liable for the entire loan balance if certain prohibited acts occurred.
This clause is referred to as a springing recourse provision. Although
traditional bad acts have been fraud, misappropriation of funds, willful
misconduct, gross negligence, and unauthorized transfer of collateral, “bad
acts” can also include the borrower’s filing a bankruptcy petition.
By imposing personal liability on the guarantor who is usually in charge
of the borrower, bad boy guaranties create a financial disincentive for the
guarantor to cause or even permit the borrower to impede the lender’s
collateral enforcement action by filing a bankruptcy petition. The resulting
liability for breach depends on negotiated terms. A bad boy guaranty can
provide for consequential damages resulting for breach, full recourse
liability, or anything in between.108
The courts that have looked at these provisions generally find that the
lender protections are enforceable109 and the non-recourse event need not
be within the guarantor’s control.110
Although widely used in real estate, “bad boy” guaranties are generally
not seen in connection with oil and gas transactions.111 But their use could
be expanded to cover comparable non-recourse events, such as where the
operator converts funds belonging to override owners, converts funds from
production payment, or files bankruptcy and seeks to re-characterize
108. Sebastian F.C. Kaufmann & Arthur J. Steinberg, New Decisions Offer
Lessons on Bad Boy Guaranties, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 12, 2012, at 1, available at
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/kspublic/library/publication/2012articles/3-12
nyljsteinbergkaufman.pdf. Courts have upheld these guaranties.
109. See, e.g., Heller Fin. Inc. v. Lee, No. 01 C 6798, 2002 WL 1888591 (N.D.
Ill., Aug. 16, 2002) (holding that a hotel was encumbered with liens without
lender’s prior written consent and enforcing the non-recourse carve-out clause for
loan obligations for breach of loan covenants); LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Mobile Hotel
Props., LLC, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (E.D. La. 2004) (enforcing the non-recourse
carve-out clause when the borrower amended its articles of incorporation so that
it was no longer a single purpose entity); Blue Hills Office Park LLC v. J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank, 477 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Mass. 2007) (enforcing a springing
guaranty for personal liability for the full amount of indebtedness against two real
estate developers that failed to disclose or pay over to the lender a $2 million
settlement related to a commercial development dispute); 111 Debt Acquisition
Inc. v. Six Ventures, Ltd., No. C2-08-768, 2009 WL 414181 (S.D. Ohio, Feb 18,
2009) (springing guaranty enforced against guarantors when borrower filed for
bankruptcy).
110. Michigan, Non-Recourse Mortgage Loan Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 445.1591 to 445.1595 (West Supp. 2015); Ohio, Legacy Trust Act, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5816.01 to 5816.14 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015), have passed laws
limiting the use of bad boy guaranties.
111. This Author has seen individual guaranties when an investor was putting
in 100% of funds and the geologist was contributing expertise and leases.
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production payments or overrides. This type of conduct was certainly not
contemplated by the parties. It is beyond the scope of this Article to delineate
the scope of such guaranties or the litany of conduct that could be prevented,
but this is something that should be in the credit toolkit.
VIII. MITIGATING REGULATORY RISKS
When a debtor’s property includes interests in unproductive oil or gas
wells, the debtor may seek to abandon such interest to relieve the estate of
burdensome liabilities pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 554.112
Therefore, the issue often arises as to whether a debtor may exercise its
“abandonment” power to abandon property burdened by regulatory
obligations.
There are several state or federal obligations that may arise at the end of
an oil or gas well’s useful life.113 Such obligations include the “plugging” of
the well and removal of facilities from the site, and are defined as “plugging
and abandonment” (“P&A”) or “decommissioning activities” pursuant to
federal regulations.114 Further, to protect the United States from incurring a
financial loss, the DOI has instituted a bonding program for federal lands.
Before the DOI will issue a new lease or approve the assignment of an
existing lease, the lessee or designated operator is required to obtain a
surety bond guaranteeing performance of all contractual and regulatory
obligations under that lease.115
Courts have generally held that a debtor’s abandonment power does
not allow release from such obligations, finding that, under federal law,
debtors must comply with state law.116 Further, the Fifth Circuit Court of
112. See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (allowing a debtor to abandon certain property of the
estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the
estate).
113. See, e.g., TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 89.011 (West 2010). Texas
Natural Resources Code section 89.011 provides: “The operator of a well shall
properly plug the well when required and in accordance with the commission’s
rules that are in effect at the time of the plugging.” Id. § 89.011(a).
114. 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.1700 to 250.1754 (2015).
115. 30 C.F.R. § 556.52. The United States requires supplemental bonds for
costs associated with specific oil and gas facilities, abandonment and site clearance.
Id.
116. See, e.g., Texas v. Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co.), 151 F.3d 434, 437
(5th Cir. 1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 959(b); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986) (holding that a trustee may not abandon
property in contravention of a state law reasonably designed to protect public
health or safety)). But see In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. 572, 576 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1991) (holding that a violation of state and federal environmental laws must be
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Appeals has held that P&A liabilities are entitled to administrative claim
priority if the plugging obligations accrued post-petition under state law
because the debtor cannot avoid such liability. Thus, the expenses are
“necessary” and “beneficial” to the estate under an administrative claim
analysis.117
Because P&A liability can be significant, particularly in the case of
offshore wells, a provision for payment of P&A expenses can become a
threshold issue in the administration or sale of oil and gas properties in
offshore bankruptcy cases. In fact, because a bankrupt operator may seek
to either transfer or cease operations on a lease, non-operators in the chain
of title may need to intervene to ensure that the P&A liabilities—for which
they may otherwise be financially responsible—are satisfied by the
operator or assumed by any successor.
CONCLUSION
Oil and gas companies manage all types of risk—price risk, political
risk, geological risk, etc. Credit risk, however, is often ignored. Given the
large amount of money involved in oil and gas transactions, companies
must have systems in place to protect their lien rights in sales and operating
agreements. Likewise, when appropriate, transactions should be structured
to employ the safe harbors of production payments and farmout
agreements. This foresight and diligence will achieve the benefit of its
bargain if the counterparty files bankruptcy.

coupled with a showing that the violation constitutes an imminent and identifiable
harm to limit the trustee’s powers of abandonment). Notably, in finding that the
trustee was permitted to abandon the contaminated property, the Shore Court
“place[d] great weight on the lack of activity on the part of a state agency charged
with protecting the health and welfare of the people of the State of Texas.” 134
B.R. at 579.
117. In re H.L.S. Energy Co., 151 F.3d at 437.

